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Abstract 
Through reviewing and combing the previous studies on linguistic disagreement over the past three 
decades from four dimensions or research hotspots—definitions of disagreement, classifications of 
disagreement, factors affecting the ways of raising disagreement, and strategies for disagreement 
presentation, this study shows that disagreement has experienced the transformation from being 
regarded as a marginal impolite phenomenon to an important, common socio-pragmatic phenomenon 
catching a mounting number of linguists’ attention. They define disagreement via directions or 
discoveries of corresponding studies, but the vague boundary between the synonymous concepts 
restrains the definition progress. The criteria of taxonomies, with their respective merits and demerits, 
contain the forms, functions and levels of disagreement. As to the factors affecting the disagreement 
raising, contextualization becomes the trend. But the overlaps of the specific factors’ scopes leave 
space for scrutinization. It is found that, given significant multi-perspective findings, disagreement 
literature often rents ideas from Impoliteness Theory, conducive to the discount of objectivity and 
pertinence of their elaboration. The disagreement-response or disagreement-reaction part, overtly 
rarely studied, makes a breakthrough for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
Disagreement is a common phenomenon in human interaction since although people are apt to be 
cooperative and polite when communicating with others, each individual has sampled all the different 
varieties of experience and may hold disparate views on the same thing, which unavoidably incurs 
disagreements. The disagreeing point can be as small as the choice of buying a can of cola or sprite, or 
as big as territorial disputes between countries. But as impolite illocutions were regarded as marginal, 
abnormal acts in contrast with large-scale, normal polite acts (Leech, 1983, p. 105), disagreement was 
defined as “the antipode of agreement” (Angouri & Locher, 2012, p. 1549) and so received less 
attention in earlier studies. With the progress of pragmatics, it has been revealed that occurrence of 
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inharmonious discourse is frequent and regular. “Conceptual bias” gradually declining, politeness is 
often found to give way to impoliteness, as noted in a mutually complementary relation (Bousfield, 
2008, p. 2). Disagreement therefore catches linguists’ eye and has been dealt with under variable 
theories, such as Speech Act Theory (Sorning, 1977; Mehregan et al., 2013; Netz, 2014; Bardovi-Harlig 
et al., 2015), Politeness Theory (Rees-Miller, 2000; Edstrom, 2004; Sifianou, 2012; Dynel, 2015), 
Preference Theory (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987) and theories of epistemic modals (Cater, 2014; 
Khoo, 2015; Eriksson, 2016; Boyce & Hazlett, 2016).  
In China, research on conflict talk is not rare (see Zhao, 2004; Zhao & Zhang, 2005; Li & Zhang, 2007; 
Ran, 2010; Lai, 2011; Ran & Liu, 2011; Ran & Yang, 2011; Yang, 2013; Gong, 2014; Chen & Li, 2016; 
Hu & Fan, 2016). It usually involves multiple aspects, like construction, generic structures, discourse 
strategies, forming reasons, pragmatic functions, response or reaction of conflict talk in the discourses 
or texts of training courses, academic meetings, commercial communications, literary works, family 
communications, computer-mediated communications and so on. As a (sub)type of conflict talk, 
however, disagreement is rarely touched at home, let alone the targeted or focused disagreement 
research. 
Research on disagreement multiplies in western countries in diversity and complexity. The craze for 
disagreement studies began in 1983, seeing research concerns shift several times with the rise and 
development of some linguistic schools, such as Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Linguistics. 
Research discoveries become more and more plentiful and in turn help to dig out more and more 
research topics. This study intends to review these extensive studies from four 
perspectives—definitions of disagreement, classifications of disagreement, factors affecting the ways 
of raising disagreement and strategies for disagreement presentation. By pointing out the remaining 
problems in the previous study, we hold that there is plenty of room for further efforts, such as the 
differentiation of confusing synonymous concepts relevant to disagreement and the big land of 
disagreement response to be developed. 
If research on disagreement occurs in several fields, such as economics, politics and neuroscience, this 
study focuses on the studies in linguistics, more so in pragmatics which has shouldered the lion’s share 
of the (im)politeness study. 
 
2. Definitions of Disagreement 
Quite a few scholars try to give exact dictionary-pattern definitions to disagreement. One way is to 
summarize the predecessor’s research or borrow the pattern of synonymous concepts, such as 
“opposition”. Kakava (1993, p. 36) defines the term “opposition” as “an oppositional stance (verbal or 
non-verbal) to an antecedent verbal or non-verbal action”, which is used by Dynel (2015, p. 340) to 
refer to “disagreement”. Indeed, disagreement is regarded as the mild stage or general category of 
opposition by Kakava (2002, pp. 1538-1539), who also roughly distinguishes “opposition”, 
“disagreement”, “argument or dispute” from the degree of offensiveness and length of turns. 
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Disagreement “involves the negation of a stated or implied proposition” (ibid., p. 1539), which is more 
like a reaction than stance. Rees-Miller’s definition is a summary of the predecessor, Sornig’s ideas 
(1977, pp. 361-366). Rees-Miller (2000, p. 1088) defines disagreement as: “A Speaker S disagrees 
when s/he considers untrue some Proposition P uttered or presumed to be espoused by an Addressee A 
and reacts with an utterance the propositional content or implicature of which is Not P”. This, as I 
interpreted, grasps the core statements of Sornig—the conditions in which disagreement can be realized 
or successful, but misunderstands the so-called “natural characteristics of disagreement”. Rees-Miller 
thinks that Sornig characterizes disagreement as an utterance since Sornig’s study gives priority to 
verbal expressions of disagreement. Sornig holds, in fact, that disagreement is a reflection of a 
preceding (speech) act (ibid., p. 361) or even a metalinguistic or metacommunicative act (ibid., p. 362), 
although the object of his study touches upon classroom discourse merely. Therefore, Rees-Miller’s 
criticism of the incompleteness of Sornig’s definition is untenable. Rees-Miller’s borrowing, though 
comprehensive and practical, may misinform or over-interpret the meaning of the original if the 
borrower tends to adapt the borrowing to his/her own study. 
Other linguists try to conclude definition from their research findings. Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 
(1997, p. 193) observe that disagreement is a ‘‘necessary part of the process of reaching agreement’’, 
which affirms that disagreement is a common rather than marginal phenomenon in human 
communication. Similarly, the definition by Sifianou (2012, p. 1554) gives disagreement a positive 
evaluation—pointing out that sometimes it can “strengthen interlocutors’ relationships”, adding a little 
opaquely that “[d]isagreement can be defined as the expression of a view that differs from that 
expressed by another speaker”. Sifianou realizes the duality of disagreement and emphasizes the 
influence of linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts on it. Mehregan et al. (2013, p. 598), however, 
define expression of disagreement as a communicative act “employed when the speaker has different 
attitudes from his/her interlocutor or when he/she is not contented with his/her interlocutor’s behavior 
or utterance”. This definition, avoiding hitting the nature of disagreement, chooses a standpoint of 
context (of situation) where disagreement occurs. 
The definitions discussed above all serve general or “pure” disagreement. Other definitions that 
describe subcategories of disagreement, such as “modal disagreement” (Khoo, 2015, p. 512) and 
“group disagreement” (Carter, 2016, p. 14), are not to be taken into account in this study. Since these 
definitions generally derive from the directions or discoveries of corresponding studies, accordingly, 
they unavoidably inherit the limitations of the studies. In fact, disagreement is “ambiguous and 
polysemous” (Angouri, 2012, p. 1551), and becomes more and more complicated with the depth of 
relevant research. No matter how disagreement is defined, it has to satisfy this to be a ‘good 
disagreement’: an antecedent proposition or act P and an opposition or negation to it, namely NOT-P. 
In fact, the definition of “disagreement” has gone through two kinds of transformation. The first one is 
the transformation from the early standpoints that see disagreement as a negative linguistic 
phenomenon or act to the later studies that find disagreement non-inherently negative. The early studies 
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define disagreement as a speech act expressing different opinions (Sornig, 1973, 1997; Kakava, 1993), 
a dispreferred reaction (Sacks, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984) or an impolite phenomenon (Leech, 1983; 
Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper, 1996). Although they interpret disagreement via various theories, 
disagreement is consistently negative and inharmonious in their approaches. Disagreement means 
questioning or rejecting the interlocutor’s opinions or expressions, which will threaten his/her face and 
even damage the social relationship between the communicators. Therefore, it “behooves” us to avoid 
or mitigate disagreement in interaction. Fortunately, with the development of practical research, many 
scholars point out the non-inherent negativity of disagreement (e.g., Angouri & Locher, 2012, p. 1549; 
Zhu, 2014, p. 87). Disagreement is an unmarked, preferred act and even the norm on some special 
occasions, like the activities of problem solving, decision making and commercial meeting, etc. 
(Tannen, 1981, 1998; Gray, 2001; Tjosvold, 2008; Angouri & Locher, 2012), in which there needs to be 
thoughts in collision so as to improve scientificity or creativity of the solutions. Sometimes, 
disagreement can also be seen as a sign of intimate relationship or high social competence (Schiffrin, 
1984, p. 311; Kakava, 2002, p. 1562; Locher, 2004, pp. 280-281; Angouri & Tseliga, 2010, p. 66; 
Sifianou, 2012, p. 1554). 
The second kind of transformation centers around the oppositional object, switching from the external 
to the internal. The research mentioned in the last paragraph is prone to describe or analyze the 
properties of disagreement. The content incurring disagreement is the antecedent speech act, which is 
the external, superficial aspect. Therefore, in such cases, the objects of disagreement are those speech 
acts that can be directly recognized. Recently, however, there arise explorations of epistemic 
disagreement (Cowie, 2014; Khoo, 2015; Carter, 2016; Eriksson, 2016; Boyce & Hazlett, 2016). Say, 
for example, Chinese people believe in the Buddha, westerners believe in God. This type of 
disagreement does not negate the expressions or opinions of the other party. Although interlocutor A 
knows that interlocutor B’s belief is not the same as his/hers, he/she cannot assure that the ideas of B 
are always wrong for he/she may alter or revise his/her own P-belief in the process of communication. 
Therefore, such disagreement centers around previous assertions more than opinions (Khoo, 2015, p. 
512) and is subject to the continuously changing conditions. Some researchers are thus inclined to 
transfer (from external act) to internal adjustment, hence seeming to look for a more plausible 
interpretation. 
 
3. Classifications of Disagreements 
As seen above, there are various approaches to disagreement, according to its forms, functions, levels 
or objects. Due to the shortage of uniformity or relativity of these taxonomies, they will be presented 
chronologically in this section. 
The earliest categorization could be traced to Goodwin’s (1983) dichotomy—classifying disagreement 
into “mitigated disagreement” and “aggravated disagreement” on the basis of linguistic forms and 
intonational features. She collects 200 hours’ conversations of urban black children and finds over 175 
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correction and disagreement sequences (p. 657). In her analysis, two kinds of “prefaces”—agreement 
(e.g., “well”) and delay (e.g., “I think”, the conditional “if”, questioning repetition) are often utilized to 
mitigate disagreement (p. 666). For aggravating disagreement, she holds, the speaker can apply the 
strategy of partial repetition or wh-terms + partial repetition that allows hardly any turn space. And the 
falling intonation helps to increase the force (p. 667). The use of “polarity”—explicit opposition (e.g., 
“no”) with no supportive expressions is also a popular trick for aggravated disagreement (p. 669). 
Goodwin’s taxonomy concerns such speech details as diction and intonation, her analysis of utterances 
being quite specific and convincing. Note, however, that the quantitative examples cover not only 
disagreement but correction. Besides the vagueness of boundary between the two activities, the 
unknown number of disagreements and frequencies of these linguistic forms can also be problems that 
may affect the research results. 
From the property of disagreement, Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) summarize four types of disagreement: 
“irrelevancy claim”, “challenge”, “contradiction” and “counterclaim”. To express opposite opinions, 
the speaker can make use of irrelevancy claims, i.e., criticizing the antecedent speech for irrelevance to 
the here-and-now discussed topic (p. 229). The second type, reluctance markers, esp. the interrogative 
markers wh-particles, makes a challenge to the hearer since he/she has to make more efforts to drive the 
previous claim home (p. 230). Contradiction is similar to the direct negation for containing singly 
negative particles. The last kind, counterclaim is more mitigated by initiating a disagreement with 
pauses or prefaces (p. 231). What makes the classification more reasonable is the consideration of turns. 
The authors discuss the four types in the stages of Turn 1, Turn 2 and Turn 3 respectively. Their study 
would achieve exactitude and forcefulness provided that they cash in on clearer distinctions between 
“disagreement”, “arguing” and “dispute”. 
The trichotomy of Rees-Miller (2000) enjoys greater popularity in the disagreement research. Similar 
to Goodwin, Rees-Miller categorizes disagreement by the standard of linguistic forms. Those including 
linguistic markers that belong to the expressions of negative or positive politeness are “softened 
disagreements”. Those containing explicit linguistic markers (negative words) or repetitions of 
previous claims belong to “disagreements neither softened nor strengthened”. And those that strengthen 
disagreements “by means of rhetorical questions, intensifiers (universal quantifiers), use of the personal 
you with an imperative or accusatory force, or judgmental vocabulary” (p. 1094) would make 
“aggravated disagreements”, the third type. It is found, among other things, that “softened 
disagreement” is the most frequent kind of disagreement in class settings. 
Comparing the fierce Israeli political talk-show debates with xavruta interactions in contemporary 
Talmudic academies (disagreement as a marked preferred phenomenon in both events), Blum-Kulka et 
al. (2002) note three kinds of disagreement. They are “ungrounded disagreement”, that overtly and 
directly negates the previous proposition without explanation (p. 1577), “grounded disagreement”, that 
is also unmitigated but followed by a supportive proposition (p. 1578), and “downgraded 
disagreement”, that regularly adopts the classic patterns “yes, but…” while the part after “but” really 
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counts (p. 1579). Although the analysis of the two speech events seems to be a diachronic comparative 
study in Jewish political debates, there exists incomparability between the real oral political debates 
during xavruta and the virtual political debates in a talk show program. And the criterion of the 
taxonomy cannot be accepted since the three kinds do not relate to each other in a parallel manner. 
Elga (2006) studies disagreement from the view of epistemic relationship between the interlocutors. It 
is argued that the hearer’s selection of response is influenced by his/her judgment of the speaker who 
raises disagreement. Comparatively, the speaker may be an epistemic peer with or epistemic superior or 
inferior to the hearer (p. 493). Accordingly, disagreement raised by the speaker can be classified into 
“peer disagreement”, “superior disagreement” and “inferior disagreement”. On the ground of Elga’s 
thought, Carter (2016) further categorizes “peer disagreement” by distinguishing “group peer 
disagreement” from “individual peer disagreement”. This classification bears no suspicion for its 
simplicity and unambiguousness. It may not be a valuable taxonomy but it does help scholars to narrow 
down their research scopes. 
Judging whether the truth value of the proposition exists, Eriksson (2016) proposes a new taxonomy of 
disagreement. If the point incurring disagreement is the different beliefs towards one object or thing, 
the proposition has truth value, that is to say, it is either true or false in the shoes of the hearer (p. 778). 
Such disagreement is called “disagreement in belief”. Sometimes, however, there are claims that are 
faulty or faultless. A typical example is the variety of taste: one cannot impose his/her food likings onto 
other people. Despite disagreements between interlocutors, the fact is that perhaps neither of their 
claims is erroneous. This sort of disagreement faultlessness means “disagreement in attitude” (p. 775). 
Eriksson’s classification is creatively interesting, but due to the varied personalities of people in the 
world, can we assume that all things in the globe leave them various reflections? How do various 
interlocutors evaluate the truth value of others’ propositions, for agreement or disagreement? 
The above taxonomies apparently classify disagreement from such different perspectives as 
disagreement forms, functions and levels. Because each of the taxonomies serves as the tool or result in 
its study, it has its own strengths and weaknesses. It is up to the researchers to opt for the taxonomy 
they prefer or, if necessary, make some adjustments or supplements. 
 
4. Factors Affecting the Ways of Raising Disagreement 
In disagreement studies, the expressing ways of raising disagreement are among the earliest addressed 
issues. The various forms of disagreement (see §3) reflect the fact that disagreement raising does not 
follow the same pattern. Analyses of lexical, syntactical and textual patterns are principal parts in some 
research. Edstrom (2004, p. 1505), for example, discovers that Venezuelans used to voice disagreement 
by direct expressions like “forget it”, “don’t even think it” or by indirect expressions like “I’m going to 
give you an example”. Angouri and Tseliga (2010) study “impolite” expressions which include 
disagreement in two online Greek fora, and they find that at the level of micro-context (discourse 
context), there occurs lexicalization of aggravated disagreement by means of the particle “re” and 
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special spelling and punctuation. Bardovi-Harlig et al. (2015, p. 325) point out several syntactical 
patterns of expressing different views in academic discussions: “Yeah but”/“I agree… but” to do 
agree-before-disagree, “What do you mean”/“You’re saying” for hinting the following specific opinion; 
and “I don’t think so” as an unclad (signal of) disagreement. And Uzelgun et al. (2015, p. 1) focus on 
the sequential pattern “yes, but” from agreement to disagreement in the discussion of a controversial 
topic—climate change to uncover the discourse functions of such constructions.  
What makes the forms of disagreement so various or why do people adopt different ways to raise 
disagreement? The purposes for human communication are more than exchanging information. 
Personal experience(s) make(s) distinct ways of thinking, hence quite different views out of various 
considerations, like ensuring their own interest, constructing rapport relationship, finding the most 
reasonable answer, etc. Scores of factors comprehensively affect the ways of disagreement expressions. 
Which contributes more to the final expression (euphemistic opposition or direct negation), the scalar 
relationship between the interlocutors, the property of the activity, or the personality of the speaker? It 
depends on the specific context or contextualizes. 
Among these complex factors, initial attention falls on such socio-pragmatic parameters as “social 
distance”, “power” and “rating of imposition” based on Politeness Theory (see Brown & Levinson, 
1987, p. 74). As a face-threatening act, (ways of) disagreement raising can be limited by assessments of 
these sociological variables. It is argued that the closer the social distance between the interlocutors, the 
more direct the expression of disagreement; that the bigger the imbalance of the relative power, the 
more strategies to soften the disagreement; and that the severer the disagreement (in other words, the 
greater the damage to the hearer’s face), the more euphemistic the expression of disagreement. 
Nevertheless, since disagreement is regarded, by laymen at least, as an impolite phenomenon, of course 
the above idea inherits all the problems that beset Brown & Levinson’s Politeness Theory. Out of this 
limited framework, later researchers (Rees-Miller, 2000; Sifianou, 2012; Angouri, 2012; Netz, 2014; 
Zhu, 2014; Kompa, 2015) realize the significance of considering particular contexts in elucidating the 
causes of the variety of disagreement expressions. Social distance, relative power relationship and the 
severity of impoliteness are all supposed to give way to the specificity of the context. As mentioned 
before, disagreement on some special occasions is not a dispreferred or damaging act at all; it is 
welcomed and even becomes the norm of such activities that discuss controversial topics or expect 
critical thinking in nature. Some scholars even nominate “contextualism” as a crucial factor (e.g., 
Kompa, 2015, p. 137) to emphasize its consequence. In addition, there appear discoveries of other 
multiple factors or reasons such as “identity” (Angouri & Tseliga, 2010; Sharma, 2013), “purpose” 
(Rees-Miller, 2000; Sharma, 2013), “relationship” (Sharma, 2013), “gender” (Parvaresh & Eslami, 
2009; Mehregan et al., 2013), “property of the activity” (Mehregan et al., 2013) and “competence” 
(Priest, 2016) in their respective attempts to construct disagreement. The explanations of these factors 
are, to some extent, reasonable for their studies, but the names and conceptual content of some factors 
feel vague: for instance, the scope of “context” can embrace all of the other factors since macro-context 
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is a relative and broad concept; “relationship” involves the considerations of the “identities” of and 
“social distance” between the interactants; the content of “power” is also an ambiguous term. With 
ambiguity of various sorts, their studies make disagreement open to further efforts. 
 
5. Strategies for Disagreement Presentation 
Strategies are to be applied on condition that there need to be unusual or marked expressions, either to 
mitigate or aggravate disagreement. In addition to the mentioned lexical, syntactical and textual 
patterns to do softened or aggravated disagreement (see §4), the specific discussions of strategies 
employed to present disagreement are frequent. 
Garcia (1989) compares the stylistic devices applied by American and Venezuelan students in the 
role-play situations of disagreeing in English (p. 299). It is found that the American students take use of 
more mitigation, usually modality markers to raise disagreement than the Venezuelan students (p. 308). 
Consequently, the different choices in stylistic devices can be a comparison between mitigated and 
aggravated disagreement. They are: “downtoned challenge versus direct challenge”, “downtoned 
suggestion versus order”, “expression of willingness to cooperate versus refusing to cooperate”, 
“impersonal accusation versus criticism of a third party”, “impersonal denial versus strong denial” and 
“giving reasons in different contexts” (pp. 308-317). 
Based on Garcia’s discovery, Mehregan et al. (2013) replace the strategy of “criticism of a third party” 
by “opting out strategy” when analyzing “the disagreement strategies used by the male and female 
Persian respondents in formal and informal situations” (p. 600). And it is concluded that the more 
confrontational the speaker is, the more directly the disagreement is expressed, and vice versa (p. 601). 
In the study of informal conversations among young Greek people, Georgakopoulou (2001) finds that 
they prefer to imply disagreement rather than contrast with others explicitly (p. 1886). The main 
strategies used are adding some prefacing markers, such as the particle “re” and the interrogative 
phrase “na sup po kati” to serve as preludes, followed by storytelling-like expressions and repeated 
questions. Although Georgakopoulou highlights the markers adopted to imply rather than mitigate 
disagreement (p. 1888), they are indeed the strategies to soften disagreement. Such distinction or 
emphasis does not make much sense, so it seems. 
Angouri and Tseliga (2010) also approach Greek talks, but in a different context—CMC (Computer 
Mediated Communication). By comparing the ways to construct disagreement in two types of online 
fora, the authors observe unconventional spellings and punctuations as a signal of impoliteness and “re 
connecting with name, mate or negative attributive adjective” often used to initiate strong disagreement 
(p. 77). However, some claims that explain the causes for differences between the “students” and the 
PA fora in disagreeing do not sound so convincing, such as the age analysis. 
Shum and Lee (2013) do not distinguish the kinds of disagreement when putting forward eleven 
common strategies: giving negative comments, using short vulgar phrases, raising rhetorical questions, 
making a personal stance, making an ironic statement, cursing, giving opposite opinions, rewording, 
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giving personal experience, giving facts and reprimanding (p. 58). In fact, it is an integration of the 
discoveries in the works of Culpeper (1996), Locher (2004) and Bousfield (2008). But that Shum & 
Lee list these strategies in aggravation-degree or mitigation-degree order is plausible. Moreover, 
overlaps are found among their strategies. 
Netz (2014) makes use of five-point likert scale to classify disagreement into five levels and discusses 
the parallel strategies (pp. 149-150): a) notably long pauses, compounded downtoners, hesitations, 
uncertainty indicators and intonation rise to present highly mitigated disagreement; b) strategies similar 
to the first kind but of lower-density to construct mitigated disagreement; c) more explicit 
contradictions for neither mitigated nor aggravated disagreement; d) explicit and concise contradictions 
without accompaniment of lengthy accounts to carry out an aggravated disagreement; and e) concise 
and explicit contradictions with repetitions of negation to raise highly aggravated disagreement. 
Although the (im)polite extent of these kinds of disagreement differs, the criteria whereby to judge 
whether it is a “highly mitigated disagreement” or “mitigated disagreement” and whether it is a “highly 
aggravated disagreement” or “aggravated disagreement”, as we can see, are not clear due to the 
relations of inclusion. 
Because disagreement as an impolite or bad act in some research, the strategies used to mitigate or 
aggravate disagreement are to some extent rented from the strategies to soften or strengthen 
impoliteness. Therefore, the objectivity and pertinence of the statements in those studies fall subject to 
discount or scrutiny. 
 
6. Remaining Problems and Further Studies 
By the specific discussions and evaluations of previous multidimensional studies on disagreement (see 
§2-5), the transformation of research concerns and the research status and trend can be concluded in 
Table 1. 
As shown in Table 1, Disagreement research in western countries is systematic and mature to some 
degree. With the progress of pragmatics and the rise of Cognitive Science, disagreement research has 
experienced a trend of multi-perspectivization and diversification. First, linguists no longer restrict 
disagreement in a narrow range—see it as a marginal, negative phenomenon, but rather affirm its 
research significance. Second, the traditional theoretical frameworks are less popular than before. 
Theories of epistemic modals borrowed from cognitive science are in style. The object incurring 
disagreement, therefore, shifts from antecedent opinion to antecedent assertion. Third, disagreement 
research is witnessing more perspectives and achievements. Recent taxonomies classify disagreement 
by its functions or the interlocutors’ epistemic relationship rather than by the superficial forms and 
characteristics. And the studies of the ways, factors and strategies to raise disagreement, as we can see, 
multiply and diversify. 
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Table 1. Progression of Disagreement Research 
Research Foci Early Time Recent Time 
Definitions dispreferred, impolite action 
non-inherently negative, 
common phenomenon 
Theories 
Speech Act Theory 
Politeness Theory 
Preference Theory 
Theories of Epistemic Modals 
(Cognitive Science) 
Oppositional Objects antecedent opinion antecedent assertion 
Classification Criteria form, property function, epistemic relationship 
Raising Ways lexical pattern syntactical and textual pattern 
Socio-pragmatic Parameters 
social distance, power,  
rating of imposition 
contextualism 
(identity, purpose, relationship, 
property of the activity, competence, etc.) 
Strategies 
single standard: 
to soften or aggravate disagreement 
diversified standards: 
synthesizing level, diction, tone, intonation, 
syntactical structure, etc. 
 
Nevertheless, since “disagreement” has a number of synonyms, such as “conflict”, “opposition”, 
“argument”, “dispute”, “negation”, “contradiction” and “objection”, term incongruity sometimes leads 
to theorizing confusion. Some scholars replace “disagreement” by other terms casually or invariably, 
unconditionally regard some of them as exact synonyms (e.g., Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Kakava, 
2002; Langlotz & Locher, 2012; Sharma, 2013). This lends some linguists an opportunity for 
metascientific discussion of these terms for disagreement studies (e.g., Georgakopoulou, 2001; Angouri, 
2012; Dynel, 2015). But it is not a surprise that, with their terminology “clarification”, the boundaries 
between these notions are still in a mess. It is necessary to differentiate them so as to restrict the 
disagreement research scope. 
Research on disagreement revisited hitherto, we could find the high diversity in relevant studies: from 
definition to expression, from daily conversation (e.g., Locher, 2004; Habib, 2008; Zhu, 2014) to 
institutional discourse (e.g., Angouri & Tseliga, 2010; Langlotz & Locher, 2012; Shum & Lee, 2013), 
from pragmatics to socio-psychology, to name a few. But the significant disagreement-response or 
disagreement-reaction part does not get enough attention. How do people react to disagreement? Are 
there differences between the reactions in differentiated situations? What are the strategies used to 
respond to disagreement? What are the effects of these strategies? They are among all the (more) 
interesting topics to be addressed, as far as disagreement is concerned. 
Recent studies on disagreement are prone to quantitative methods when dealing with corpus data 
(Rees-Miller, 2000; Georgakopoulou, 2001; Kakava, 2002; Angouri, 2012; Bolander, 2012; Langlotz & 
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Locher, 2012; Netz, 2014; Bardovi-Harlig et al., 2015; Uzelgun et al., 2015) to make the results more 
objective, but the analyses and discussions on the data are inevitably subjective. For instance, what is 
the criterion of judging the effectiveness of disagreements? How do researchers prove or guarantee 
plausibility of their deductions? Plenty of studies, for shortage of assessment or a complete evaluated 
system, fail to verify, let alone prove their discoveries. 
Finally, considering involvement of psychological facets in disagreement interpretation, it is not certain 
with many studies whether the analyzed disagreeing expressions are authentic. Given various contexts, 
the speaker may hide his/her minds or change his/her diction, so it is deducible that to judge the 
sincerity of disagreements suggests more work than so far assumed. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Disagreement is one of the foci of linguistic research as long as human interaction exists. The scope of 
disagreement is very large since it can cross several turns and all the confrontational utterances can 
indicate disagreement. But now that there is a need to differentiate those synonymous concepts 
(disagreement, argument, conflict, etc.), it may be simple and effective to restrict the specific 
disagreement research in the study on the initial turn of raising different opinions (Not-P). 
“Negotiation”, “argument” or “conflict” that contains more than one-turn interaction involves 
disagreement in each turn. In other words, a disagreement includes only one turn but it can be entailed 
in other kinds of conflict talk that involve turn-taking. 
Their relationship and difference can be roughly presented in Figure 1 as below. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between the Synonymous Concepts 
 
As stated in Figure 1, a conflict talk aims at one topic, which can figure out the complex interlaced 
relationship of the utterances and turns among multiple interlocutors. With the rise of conflictiveness or 
confrontationality of social interactions in modern work and life, people’s (positive) face is more often 
than ever before, so it seems, so that conflict talks easily occur. Conflict talk is divided into 
disagreement, negotiation, argument and dispute. For analysis convenience, I differentiate disagreement 
from other kinds of conflict talk from the view of turns, so that I restrain it in a single turn, at the 
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sacrifice of turn-taking, among other things, so as to highlight disagreement as an opposition to the 
antecedent P. In cases of turn-taking studies, nonetheless, the researcher can choose to cope with one 
and no more than one stage of conflict talk for an investigation of its disputes, arguments, 
argumentations, negotiations, and resolutions. And he/she can try treating each opposite turn as a 
disagreement just to figure out the complex relationships. There are, for example, Disagreement 1, 
Disagreement 2, Disagreement 3, ... Disagreement n. Moreover, disagreement can be called 
negation/denial, contradiction, objection or opposition on different occasions according to 
conflictiveness or confrontationality. Such a pragmatic labor division is a preliminary or primary, rather 
than utmost or ultimate attempt to figure out these confusing synonymous concepts relevant to 
disagreement. 
As to the nature of disagreement, I agree on contextualism—it depends on the specific situations. 
Disagreement itself is non-inherently positive or negative. It is unwelcomed in social etiquette but 
expected at thesis defenses. It can be an effective way to resolve problems and conflicts. As water is the 
source of life and meanwhile, it can be the devil to destroy everything, disagreement incurs disharmony, 
while at other times improving efficiency of decisions.  
I am inspired by the finding that there still exists large space in the field of research on disagreement. 
Besides the mentioned defects in previous studies, the big land of disagreement response awaits to be 
explored: the various responsive ways, the factors that affect the ways, the responsive strategies and the 
effects, etc. By putting these questions into different regions and fields or even having a comparison 
between cultures, there must be a large number of interesting topics and discoveries. 
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Note 
Note 1. The word is not in italic form in the original text (Rees-Miller, 2000, p. 1094). Here I italicize it 
because “you” plays the role of the studied object. 
